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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
THORN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 














* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
THORN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC. 
* * * * * * * 
Case No. 15647 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and Respondent, Thorn Construction Company, 
Inc. (herein referred to as "Thorn"), is seeking additional 
compensation from the Utah Department of Transportation (herein 
referred to as "The State") under a highway construction con-
tract, NS-184(1) and NR-302(1), Wanship southeasterly toward 
Peoa and Rockport State Park access road, for extra expenses 
incurred in connection with (1) a greater than 25% underrun in 
the item of "borrow" and (2) a widening of the turning radii 
at the location where the new access road meets the existing 
roadway. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the trial of this matter, the Honorable Marcellus 
K. Snow, sitting without jury, determined that $24,500.00 was 
a reasonable amount to be awarded to Thorn for extra expenses 
incurred in connection with the widening of the turning radii 
and the borro'w underrun. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Thorn seeks af f irmance of the judgment of the lower 
· h t f $24 500 oo together with interest thereon court in t e amoun o , · , 
at the legal rate from and after October 15, 1974. 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
While Thorn does not necessarily disagree with 
Appellant's statement of facts, some of the State's purported 
statements of fact are in reality conclusions of law and for 
that reason are disputed. Furthermore, Appellant has stated 
facts which are immaterial to the issues of this action and 
has failed to state facts which Thorn deems to be material. 
For these reasons, Thorn respectfully submits the following 
statements of material fact, together with statements contra-
verting appellant's version of the facts. 
On March 27, 197 3, Thorn entered into a construction 
contract with the State covering a project known as NS-184(1) 
and NR-302(1), Wanship southeasterly toward Peoa and Rockport 
State Park Access Road (herein referred to as "the project"). 
The written agreement executed by the parties incorporated t~ 
Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, 
1970 edition, (herein referred to as "Standard Specifications").: 
The Standard Specifications govern such i terns as scope of work, r 
control of work, control of material, prosecution and progress, 
and measurement and payment. Significant words and phrases 
used in the Standard Specifications are defined in Section iro, ' 
wherein the term "engineer" is defined as "the state highway 
engineer of the department, acting directly or through his 
duly authorized representatives, who is responsible for engi· 
-2-
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neering supervision of the construction". The term "supple-
mental agreement" is defined as "a negotiated agreement consti-
tuting a modification of the originally executed contract and 
covering work beyond its general scope". 
The engineer's estimate, prepared by the State in 
connection with the Wanship project, included a requirement 
for 28,100 cubic yards of borrow material. At the completion 
of construction, it was determined that only 15,305 cubic 
yards of borrow material had been removed, transported, and 
placed by Thorn at various points along the project. Because 
the actual quantity of borrow constituted a decrease of more 
than 25% in the quantity of a major contract item, Section 
104.02 of the Standard Specifications became applicable. 
Section 104.02 states in part that if demand is made in writing 
by either party to the contract, a supplemental agreement will 
be necessary before any alteration is made which involves 
any one of the following: 
* * * 
(3) an increase or decrease of more 
than 25% in the quantity of any major 
contract item except "excavation for 
structures" and "piles." 
Section 104.02 further states that "* * *In the event of a 
decrease, any adjustments in payment shall apply to the quantity 
or quantities of work actually performed and that * * * no 
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allowance shall be made in the supplemental agreement for 
anticipated profits." As previously pointed out, a "supple-
mental agreement" is defined as "a negotiated agreement con-
stituting a modification of the originally executed contract 
and covering work beyond its general scope." (emphasis added) 
Section 104.02 further gives the engineer. several 
alternatives whenever a satisfactory supplemental agreement 
cannot be negotiated: 
"When it is determined by the 
engineer that under the provisions of 
this subsection, a supplemental agree-
ment is justified and an agreement 
satisfactory to both parties cannot 
be made, the engineer may determine 
an amount which he feels is fair and 
equitable, and order the contractor 
to proceed accordingly, or may order 
the work performed on a force account 
basis or cancel the work from the 
contract." 
When the parties attempted to negotiate a suppl~e~tl 
agreement in connection with the borrow underrun, the state took 
the position that Thorn was not entitled to any additional 
compensation except overhead expense calculated on the amount 
of the underrun (12,795 cubic yards) based upon a breakdown 
of the i terns comprising Thorn's original bid for the item of 
borrow ($1.20 per cubic yard). In other words, the State 
took the position that Thorn was entitled only to the amount 
allocated to overhead ($ .14 per cubic yard) multiplied by the 
amount of the underrun (12,795 dubic yards), which amounts 
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to $1,791.30. (R. 185-186) 
Thorn, on the other hand, took the position that 
because of the greater than 25% underrun, it was entitled 
to negotiate a supplemental agreement based on the actual 
costs incurred in connection with the borrow item, including 
an overhead and profit factor for the borrow actually used 
on the project (15,305 cubic yards), but not for the amount 
of the underrun (12,795 cubic yards). In other words, Thorn, 
in its attempt to negotiate a supplemental agreement in 
connection with the borrow underrun, did not feel bound by 
its initial bid of $1.20 per cubic yard. Moreover, the 
evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Thorn's costs in 
connection with the borrow item increased substantially 
because the source of 'borrow material represented by Virgil 
Mitchell, an employee of the State, to be acceptable was 
later determined to be unacceptable, and Thorn was required 
to transport the borrow material from an alternate source a 
greater distance away from the project. (R. 38) 
Interestingly, none of the witnesses who testified 
at the trial could ever remember another instance where a 
source of borrow material was found to be unacceptable. 
Virgil ~1itchell testified, for example, that in his 24 years 
experience witn the State he had never known of any other 
situation except the instant case where a source of borrow 
-5-
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was found to be unacceptable. (R. 225, 226) Grant Thorn 
further testified that in his 40 years experience in the 
highway construction business, he had never known of a 
potential borrow site that turned out to be unacceptable. 
(R. 39) At the outset of the proceedings, counsel for 
both parti~s argued their respective interpretations of 
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications, and the 
Court concluded that Thorn could introduce evidence 
bearing upon the actual costs of the borrow actually used 
on the project (15,305 cubic yards). (R. 33-35) 
During the course of construction, it was deter-
mined by the State that the turning radii at the point where 
the new access road meets the existing highway should be 
widened. The project engLneer, Edward Watson, instructed 
Thorn's Vice President, Dennis D. Weir, to perform the work 
necessary to widen the turning radii, although no specific 
amount was initially agreed upon with respect to the extra 
expenses which would be incurred in performing the work. 
(R. 77-82; 277-278) There was never any question that Mr. 
Watson ordered Thorn to widen the turning radii or that 
the State would pay the extra expenses incurred. (R. 278) 
A problem arose, however, when Thorn claimed an amount in 
excess of that which the project engineer, Mr. Watson, felt 
was reasonable. (R.280) On October 15, 1974, Thorn sent 
-6-
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a letter to the State claiming $38,642.83 for extra 
expenses incurred in connection with the borrow under-
run and the widening of the turning radii, and also 
requesting a supplemental agreement. (R. 280) Mr. Watson 
did not agree with the amount claimed by Thorn and felt 
he could not execute a supplemental agreement in the 
amount of $38,642.83, and no supplemental agreement was 
ever reached. (R. 280) 
Thorn commenced this action against the State 
seeking to recover $38,642.83 for extra expenses incurred 
in connection with the borrow underrun and in widening 
the turning radii. The trial court concluded that 
$24,500.00 was a reasonable amount to be awarded to Thorn 
in connection with these itmes, and on January 6, 1978, 
judgment was entered against the State in the amount of 
$24,500.00, together with interest thereon at the legal 
rate from and after October 15, 1974. 
The State subsequently filed this appeal, 
seeking reversal of the judgment and entry of a judgment 
in the amount of $1,791.30 or in the alternative, a new 
trial. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
CONCLUDING THAT $24,500.00 WAS 
A REASONABLE AMOUNT TO BE AWARDED 
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TO THORN IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
BORROW UNDERRUN AND WIDENING THE 
TURNING RADII 
The State has attempted in this appeal to 
encroach upon the discretion of the trier of fact below 
and essentially re-try the case on the merits. With 
respect to the scope of appellate review of discretionary 
matters, the following statement is found in 5 Am Jur 2d 
"Appeal and Error", Section 772 at page 215: 
"The necessities of judicial 
administration require the Courts 
of first instance be vested with 
a large measure of discretion in 
passing upon various matters which 
cannot, in their nature, be effec-
tively reviewed on the cold record 
transmitted to the appellate court. 
Decisions reached in the proper 
exercise of such discretion have 
frequently been said not to be 
within the proper scope of appellate 
review, and it is clearly the ordi-
nary practice of appellate courts 
to refuse to review the exercise of 
such discretion except for abuse." 
And as this Court stated in Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 
1286 (Utah, 1976), "The judgment of the trial court will 
not be reversed unless it is shown that the discretion 
exercised therein has been abused." 552 P.2d at 1290. 
The facts of the instant case are in many respects 
identical to the case of Jack B. Parson Construction Compa'.1 
vs. The State of Utah, 552 P. 2d 107 (Utah, 1976). In that 
case, the plaintiff ("Parson") sued the State in what was 
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essentially an attempt to.renegotiate the entire contract 
governing a highway construction project on Interstate 80 
between Wendover and Knolls, Utah. In Finding No. 28 of 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial 
court found that the items of bituminous material, bitu-
minous surface course, and rubber latex additive all under-
ran in excess of 25% of the proposal quantities and that 
Parson was entitled to a "supplemental agreement" in those 
three areas under the provisions of Section 104.02 of the 
Standard Specifications, the purpose of which was "* * * to 
help Parson recover costs not otherwise recovered because 
of the reduced quantity." The Court further stated in 
Finding No. 29 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law that "* * * the reasonable cost which it (Parson) is 
entitled to recover as a result of the underrun in quantities 
of bituminous items is $258,034.00." Parson's total claim 
was for $743,986.00. 
The appeal of Parson apparently arose from a 
finding of the trial court that there was a decrease of 
less than 25% of the total cost of the work, calculated 
from the original proposal quantities at the unit contract 
prices. The only issue appealed to this Court was whether 
agreed upon deletions from the contract amounting to 
$133,765.00 should be considered in calculating whether 
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there was a decrease of more than 25% of the total cost 
of the work. This Court construed Section 104.02(2) of 
the Standard Specifications in favor of Parson, concluding 
that there had in fact been a greater than 25% decrease 
in the total cost of the work and that Parson was entitled 
to an additional $116,664.00. 
In reversing the decision of the lower Court, 
this Court made the following statement with respect to 
its interpretation of Section 104.02 of the Standard Speci-
fications: 
"However, the language of the 
specifications set forth reserves 
to the State the right to make 
changes in the quantities and 
alter the details of construction 
as may be found necessary or desirable. 
Such changes may be made and apparently 
were made during the performance of 
this contract unilaterally. On the 
other hand the supplemental agreement 
is one which must be assented to by 
both of the contracting parties. In 
making a determination of whether or 
not there was an overrun or an under-
run in a particular contract the 
language of the above referred to 
specification is controlling. The 
language is clear and unambiguous 
and states that the percentage must 
be calculated from the original pro-
posed quantities. * * *We conclude 
that the calculation of the final 
contract price must be based on the 
original proposal which does not 
permit the state to deduct from the 
original contract price the change 
orders reducing the quantities. To 
-10-
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decide otherwise would permit 
the state to greatly alter the 
t~rms of the contract by the 
simple device of issuing minus 
or plus change orders. * * * 
A substantial reduction in the 
amount of work to be performed 
would tend to increase this unit 
cost and may in certain instances 
compel him (the contractor) to 
accept a loss he could not antici-
pate or guard against." 
552 P.2d 108 (emphasis added) 
The claim asserted by Thorn in the instant case 
with respect to the borrow underrun is identical to the 
claim asserted by Parson in connection with the bituminous 
material, bituminous surface cour~e, and rubber latex 
additive underruns. Thorn claimed in the lower court, as 
did Parson, that it was entitled to negotiate a supplemental 
agreement to recover costs related to the work actually 
performed and not otherwise recovered because of the reduced 
quantities. The damage exhibit used by Parson in connection 
with the bituminous underruns included amounts for overhead 
and profit related to work actually performed, not "antici-
pated profits" on the quantity of the underrun. The trial 
court accepted Parson's damage exhibit with the profit and 
overhead factors included, and the State did not question 
that finding on appeal, although it could have done so. 
Likewise, in the instant case, Thorn attempted to 
negotiate a supplemental agreement in connection with the 
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borrow underrun which included a profit factor for the 
borrow actually used on the project, and the trial court 
accepted Thorn's construction of Section 104.02 of the 
Standard Specifications. To have done otherwis~ would 
have rendered meaninghless the definition of a supplemental 
agreement, which states that such an agreement is a 
"negotiated agreement constituting a modification of the 
originally executed contract and covering work beyond 
its general scope". (emphasis added) According to the 
State's interpretation of a supplemental agreement in under-
run situations, there is no negotiation necessary, as 
evidenced by the following statement found on page 19 of 
the State's brief: 
"Past precedent within the Department 
of Transportation has been to compen-
sate the contractor for his fixed costs 
and overhead which he would not other-
wise recover because of the quantity of 
the underrun. * * *In theory then, it 
is reasonable in an underrun to pay only 
fixed costs and overhead." 
The State is simply misconstruing the language of 
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications, which states 
that "in the case of decreased quantities of work, no allow-
ance shall be made in the supplemental agreement for antic:!:.: 
pated profits." The State takes the arbitrary position 
that in underrun situations, the contractor must submit a 
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breakdown of its initial bid calculation and then accept 
the amount allocated to overhead multiplied by the amount 
of the underrun as payment for whatever expenses were 
actually incurred in connection with the underrun. The 
State's theory flies in the face of this Court's statement 
in Parson that "a substantial reduction in the apiount of 
work to be performed would tend to increase this unit cost 
and may in certain instances compel him (the contractor) 
to accept a loss he could not anticipate or guard against." 
552 P.2d 108. Indeed, Section 104.02 also states that "in 
the event of a decrease, any adjustments in payment shall 
apply to the quantity or quantities of work actually per-
formed." (emphasis added) The foregoing statement, coupled 
with the language allowing the negotiation of a supplemental 
agreement for decreases of more than 25% of a major con-
tract item, clearly gives the contractor the right to 
calculate his actual costs with respect to the quantity 
of work actually performed, and negotiate from that basis. 
The State somehow has the mistaken impression that the 
damages awarded by the lower court in the instant case 
included a profit factor connected with the amount of the 
borrow underrun, but both Thorn and Parson calculated their 
damages relative to the work actually performed, not the 
anticipated work which was never performed. 
-13-
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Thorn respectfully submits, therefore, that the 
trial court was correct in its interpretation of Section 
104.02 of the Standard Specifications, which governs the 
negotiation of supplemental agreements. Section 104.02 
clearly states that in situations where there is a decrease 
of more than 25% .in the quantity of a major contract item, 
the adjustments in payment shall apply to the quantity or 
quantities of work actually performed and that no allowance 
will be made for anticipated profits. The trial court 
correctly concluded that the amount awarded to Thorn was 
related to the costs of removing, transporting, and placing 
15,305 cubic yards of borrow material at various points 
along the project, and the decision of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE REPRESENTATIONS OF VIRGIL MITCHELL 
CONCERNING THE UTELITE BORROW PIT WERE 
BUT ONE FACTOR WHICH THE TRIAL COURT 
CONSIDERED IN AWARDING DA..1\1.AGES, NOT 
THE ENTIRE BASIS OF THE AWARD 
One of the reasons for Thorn's increased costs 
in connection with the borrow underrun was that the initial 
source of borrow known as the Utelite Pit, represented by 
Virgil Mitchell, a State employee, to be acceptable, was 
later determined to be unacceptable. In calculating its 
initial bid price of $1.20 per cubic yard for borrow 
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material, Thorn relied on the representations of Virgil 
Mitchell to the effect that the Utelite Pit was an accept-
able source of borrow. While the State and Mr. Mitchell 
attempted to absolve themselves of any responsibility in 
connection with "positive" representations concerning 
the Utelite Pit, certain facts support the conclusion of 
the trial court that Thorn was entitled to rely on the 
representations of Mr. Mitchell. First, the items compris-
ing the cost factors in calculating a bid in connection 
with borrow include royalties to the pit owner, removal 
costs, and transportation costs. It is axiomatic that 
transportation costs increase proportional to the distance 
the borrow material is hauled. When the State informed 
Thorn that the Utelite Pit was unacceptable as a source 
of borrow, arrangements were made to use the Crandall Pit 
located south of Peca, Utah, a considerably longer distance 
from the project, as an alternate source. Second, in the 
trial court, both parties had opportunity to present 
evidence relative to cost factors, and the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in determining that Thorn's 
increased transportation costs resulting from Mr. Mitchell's 
representations should be considered as a factor in the 
ultimate amount of damages awarded. 
In E. H. Morrill Company vs. The State of Cali-
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fornia, 59 Cal.Rptr. 479, 423 P.2d 551 (1967), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that a contractor is entitled 
to rely on the representations of the State relative to 
subsurface conditions where the State makes a positive 
representation concerning such conditions. The Court 
stated: 
"The responsibility of a govern-
mental agency for positive representa-
tions it is deemed to have made through 
defective plans and specifications is 
not overcome by the general clauses 
requiring the contractor to examine the 
site, to check up the plans, and to 
assume responsibility for the work. 
(Cit. omitted) Accordingly, the lan-
guage in Section 4 requiring the bidder 
to satisfy himself as to the character 
of subsurface materials or obstacles to 
be encountered cannot be relied upon 
to overcome those representations as 
to materials and obstacles which the 
State positively affirms * * * not 
to exist, and plaintiff was entitled 
to rely and act thereon." 423 P.2d 
at 554 
In the instant case, the trial court, acting as 
both the trier of fact and law, heard conflicting evidence 
relative to the representations made by Mr. Mitchell. Mr. 
Mitchell testified, in self-serving fashion, that the only 
representations he made to Thorn consisted of statements 
that the Utelite Pit was a prospective source of borrow 
material. (R. 229) Witnesses for Thorn, on the other hand, 
testified that Mr. Mitchell represented that material 
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from the Utelite Pit was available and could be used as 
borrow on the project. (R. 38-39; 55-56) The trial 
court, after having heard the evidence, concluded that 
Mr. Mitchell made a positive representation to Thorn to 
the effect that the material in the Utelite Pit was 
available and could be used as borrow on the project. 
The foregoing facts bring the instant case within 
the purview of Morrill, supra. Under the reasoning of 
Morrill, language in the contract requiring the bidder to 
satisfy himself as to the character of surface and sub-
surface materials or obstacles to be encountered cannot 
be relied upon to overcome those representations as to 
materials and obstacles which the State positively affirms. 
423 P.2d at 554. Similarly, the trial court in the instant 
case correctly concluded that language in Sections 102.05 
and 106.02 of the Standard Specifications, requiring the 
contractor to examine the construction site and determine 
the availability of materials, could not be relied upon by 
the State to overcome the positive representations of Virgil 
Mitchell that material from the Utelite Pit was available 
and could be used as borrow on the project. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE THE PROJECT ENGINEER ORDERED 
THE WIDENING OF THE TURNING RADII, AND 
BECAUSE THE AMOUNT OF THE BORROW UNDER-
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RUN COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DETERMINED 
UNTIL THE PROJECT HAD BEEN COMPLETED, 
THORN EITHER COULD NOT HAVE GIVEN OR 
WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE THE STATE 
ADVANCE NOTICE OF ITS INTENDED CLAIMS 
It is an undisputed fact that there was a greater 
than 25% decrease in the quantity of borrow used on the 
project and that Thorn could not possibly have determined 
the underrun until the final quantities had been calculated. 
It is also undisputed that Edward Watson, the project 
engineer, ordered the work done and agreed to compensate 
Thorn for extra expenses incurred in widening the turning 
radii at the point where the new access road meets the 
existing highway. Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifica-
tions clearly gives Thorn the right to negotiate a supple-
mental agreement based upon its actual costs incurred for 
work actually performed in placing 15,305 cubic yards of 
borrow on the project. And because Mr. Watson, the project 
engineer, ordered Thorn to widen the turning radii, the 
only material issue of fact to be resolved at the trial of 
this matter was the reasonableness of the amounts to be 
awarded to Thorn. And because Section 104.02 of the Standard 
Specifications authorizes the project engineer to "order 
the work performed on a force account basis", any ambiguity 
in the language must be construed against the State. 
should be remembered, in addition, that like the trial 
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court in Parson, the trial court in the instant case did 
not award the full amount of Thorn's claim. 
In its brief, the State relies heavily on section 
105.17 of the Standard Specifications to assert that Thorn 
is barred from recovering any damages because of its 
alleged failure to comply with procedural requirements. 
Section 105.17 states in part: 
"If, in any case, where the contrac-
tor deems that additional compensa-
tion is due him for work or material 
not clearly covered in the contract 
or not ordered by the engineer as 
extra work as defined herein, the 
contractor shall notify the engineer 
in writing of his intention to make 
a claim for such additional compen-
sation before he begins the work on 
which he bases the claim." (emphasis 
added) 
With respect to the borrow underrun, the State admits in 
its brief that it would have been impossible for Thorn to 
have given notice of its claim before the final borrow 
quantities had been calculated. Where the underrun 
exceeds 25%, as it did in the instant case, Section 104.02 
clearly states that "* * * a supplemental agreement will 
be necessary * * *" On October 15, 1974, Thorn requested 
a supplemental agreement in the amount of $38,642.83, and 
the sole basis for Thorn's corrunencement of this action lies 
in the fact that a satisfactory supplemental agreement 
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could not be reached. 
In summary, because (1) the amount of the borrow 
underrun could not have been determined until after the 
work had been completed; (2) the State misconstrued 
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications and was 
willing to award only $1,791.30 for the borrow underrun; 
and (3) the State ordered the work done but was unwilling 
to compensate Thorn in any amount for extra expenses 
incurred in widening the turning radii, the trial court 
correctly concluded that Thorn either could not have given 
or was not required to give the State advance notice of 
its intended claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly held that (1) Thorn 
was entitled to be awarded a reasonable amount in connection 
with the work actually performed in removing, transporting, 
and placing 15,306 cubic yards of borrow material on the 
project; (2) because the project engineer, Edward Watson, 
ordered the work done, Thorn was entitled to be awarded 
a reasonable amount for extra expenses incurred in connection 
with widening the turning radii at the point where the new 
access road meets the existing roadway; (3) Thorn either 
could not have given or was not required to give the State 
advance notice of its intended claims; and (4) the amount 
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of $24,500.00 was a reasonable amount to be awarded for 
these items under the circumstances. 
The State has had its day in Court and, even 
though dissatisfied with the results, cannot prevail in 
its assertion that there was an abuse of discretion in 
the court below. Thorn respectfully submits, therefore, 
that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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By: ~-IJ ~lit?' 
Steven H. Stewart 
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220 South Second East, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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